The years immediately following World War II saw the development of a fundamental dispute over Indian policy. Initially, the discussion was a side issue inside a larger conversation about government expenditures and the expansion of “big government.” It started out as a call to reduce trusteeship over Indian property and move some of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ responsibilities to other organizations, but it quickly grew into a full-fledged assault on the Indian reform agenda. There was a growing trend both inside and outside of Congress to see trusteeship as a failure. It had not offered a means by which the United States may terminate its obligations. Even the United States’ reputation has not improved as a result of its efforts.
Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, who chaired the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and had a significant impact on congressional policy throughout President Eisenhower’s administration, was a leading figure in this counter-movement. According to him, Indians could never aspire to be distinct from the mainstream of American society, and those who supported their aspirations by assisting them in building their villages were up to no good. He saw the Roosevelt administration’s Indian projects as misguided sociological experiments that helped to maintain the delusion that Indians would always be Indians.
He believed that Congress was the organization that would release the Indians from slavery and remove government monitoring from their property. “Unfortunately, the major and continuing congressional movement toward full freedom was delayed for a time by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Wheeler-Howard Act,” he said in summarizing the circumstances. Congress broke from its usual course of action in the midst of the Great Depression, citing the idea of advancing the welfare of all Indians. Realizing this shift in policy, Congress attempted to revert to the historic ideals of far earlier decades during the post-depression era.”
The path taken by Senator Watkins made clear his intention to revive the attrition process that was started in the last years of the previous century, even if this remark does not identify the “historic principles” to which he alluded. Indian property was to be open for appropriation once more, and tribal autonomy—even in the few regions that remained—was to be increasingly curtailed and eventually eliminated. The senator’s constant expression of concern for Indian independence really reflected his desire to absolve the US of any moral or legal liability for potential harm that Congress may cause to Native Americans.
The policy of “termination,” as it became known, was crafted during President Eisenhower’s administration from the sentiments of Senator from Utah and other individuals both inside and outside of Congress. Congress passed two laws in the summer of 1953 that set the stage for nearly 10 years of unrest that killed two significant tribes, scared off and infuriated Indians across the country, and immobilized community activity. The first was Public Law 280, which gave some designated states power over criminal and civil law and let all other states possessing Indian reservations to also take such jurisdiction, regardless of the opinions of the Native Americans. Before that legislation, Indian tribes had the authority to impose law within reservations, with the exception of a few serious offenses.
State law did not apply to reservations. Tribes without the means to sustain law enforcement within their own population had respectfully asked Congress for state authority. However, the Congress responded with laws that applied to all tribes without consulting any other tribes. The Indians objected because they believed that the action threatened one of the few remaining regions where they had local autonomy. In addition, there was a chance that the states would seek to tax Indian lands, which was a power they had been pursuing for some time. There was no respite from the demonstration.
The second measure alarmed many much more. Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83rd Congress was a policy declaration stating that it was “the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time,” Indians should be released from government supervision and control. Furthermore, the Resolution instructed the Secretary of the Interior to examine current legislation and treaties and suggest any alterations or revocations that might be required in order to free the United States.
The idea that their agreements may be rejected upset the Native Americans, since the treaties, together with the land base, had come to represent the tribes’ continued existence and had become symbolic. Their unique identity was established by the treaties, whose revocation would separate them from their own history. Anxiety was spread among the Indian populace just by the possibility of such action.
Congress authorized the United States to relinquish its responsibility for two large tribes, the Menominee of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon, as well as many smaller groups, in 1954 as part of its policy declaration. Due to their exceptionally rich wood resources, the Menominees and Klamaths were able to establish a stable economic foundation for themselves via organized exploitation.
The situation’s facts show how big of a decision was forced upon the Klamath Indians. Among the little over 2000 people of the tribe, very few had completed more education than the eighth grade; a few had some college training, but none qualified as professionally trained; even skilled laborers were in short supply. There were somewhat less than a million acres of primarily wooded terrain in the reserve. An appraisal of the merchantable timber valued at $120 million was conducted. If this property were to be liquidated, each man, woman, and kid would get an estimated $50,000 in share.
